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Abstract
We briefly introduce herein a new form of dis-
tributed, multi-agent artificial intelligence, which
we refer to as “tentacular.” Tentacular AI is distin-
guished by six attributes, which among other things
entail a capacity for reasoning and planning based
in highly expressive calculi (logics), and which
enlists subsidiary agents across distances circum-
scribed only by the reach of one or more given net-
works.
1 Introduction
We briefly introduce herein a new form of distributed, multi-
agent artificial intelligence. An AI artifact s is currently un-
derstood as an agent with a predetermined set of goals, a
set of fixed inputs and outputs, and obligations and permis-
sions. The agent does not have any leeway in accomplishing
its goals or adhering to its obligations, prohibitions, or other
legal/ethical principles that bind it. Do we need agents that go
beyond these limitations? A humble example follows: Dur-
ing your daily commute to work, an agent ac in your car ob-
serves that there is more traffic than usual headed toward the
local store. It then consults a weather service and finds that
a major storm is headed toward your town. ac conveys this
information to ah, an agent in your home. ah then communi-
cates with an agent ap on your phone and finds out that you
do not know about the storm coming your way, as you have
not made any preparations for it; and as further evidence of
your ignorance, you have not read any notifications about the
storm. ah then infers from your calendar that you may not
have enough time to get supplies after you read your notifica-
tions later in the day. ah commands ac to recommend to you
a list of supplies to shop for on your way home, including
at least n items in certain categories (e.g. 3 gallons of bottle
water).
AI of today, as defined by any orthodox, comprehensive
overview of it (e.g. [Russell and Norvig, 2009]), consists in
the design, creation, implementation, and analysis of artifi-
cial agents.1 Each such agent a takes in information about
1This is the exact phrase used by Russell and Norvig [2009].
Other comprehensive overviews match the Russell-Norvig orienta-
tion; e.g. [Luger, 2008].
its particular environment E (i.e. takes in percepts of E),
engages in some computation, and then, on the strength of
that computation, performs an action/actions in that environ-
ment. (Of course, for an agent that persists, this cycle iterates
through time.) On this definition, a computer program that
implements, say, the factorial function n! qualifies as an arti-
ficial agent (let’s dub it ‘aFAC’), one operating in the environ-
ment EN of basic arithmetic; and the human who has con-
ceived and written this program has built an artificial agent.
While plenty of the artificial agents touted today are rather
more impressive than aFAC, our aim is to bring to the world,
within a decade, a revolutionary kind of AI that yields arti-
ficial agents with a radically higher level of intelligence (in-
cluding intelligence high enough to qualify the agents as cog-
nitively conscious) and power. This envisioned AI we call
Tentacular AI, or just ‘TAI’ for short (rhymes with ‘pie’).
Before presenting architectural-level information about TAI,
we give an example that’s a bit more robust than our first-
paragraph one.
Let’s suppose that an AI agent aHOME overseeing a home
is charged with the single, unassuming task of moving a cup
on the home’s kitchen table onto a saucer that is also on that
table. How shall the agent make this goal happen? If the AI
can delegate to a robot in the house capable of manipulating
standard tabletop objects in a narrow tabletop environment
ETABLE, and that robot is at the table or can get there in a
reasonable amount of time, then of course aHOME can direct
the robot to pick up the cup and put it on the saucer. This
is nothing to write home about, since AI of today has given
us agent-robot combos that, in labs (our own, e.g.) and soon
enough in homes across the technologized world, can do this
kind of thing routinely and reliably. In fact, this kind of capa-
bility to find plans and move tabletop objects around in order
to obtain goals in tabletop environments2 has been a solved
problem from the research point of view for decades [Gene-
sereth and Nilsson, 1987], e.g. Not only that, but there are
longstanding theorems telling us that the intrinsic difficulty
of finding plans to move various standard tabletop objects in
arbitrary starting configurations in tabletop environments is
algorithmically solvable and generally tractable.3
2Such environments are variants of those traditionally termed
‘blocks-worlds.’
3E.g., see [Gupta, 1992].
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However, AI of today is, if you will, living a bit of a lie.
Why? Because in real life, the agent aHOME would not be op-
erating in only the tabletop environment ETABLE; rather the
idea is that this agent should be able to understand and man-
age the overall environmentEHOME of the home, which surely
comprises much more than the stuff standardly on one kitchen
table! Homes can have parents, kids, dogs, visitors, . . . ad in-
definitum.
For example, suppose that aHOME finds that the tabletop
robot is broken, having been mangled by the home’s frisky
beagle. Then how does aHOME solve the problem of getting
the saucer moved? Artificial agents of today capable of the
kind of planning that worked before this complication are
now hamstrung. But not so a TAI agent. One reason is that
TAI agents are capable of human-level communication. In
certain circumstances within aHOME the most efficient way for
the agent aHOME to accomplish the task may be to simply say
politely via I/IoT (Internet or Interent of Things) through a
speaker or a smartphone or a pair of smart glasses to a human
in the home (of whose mind the TAI agent has a model) sitting
at the table in question: “Would you be so kind as to place that
cup on top of the saucer?” Of course, aHOME may not be so
fortunate as to have the services of a human available: maybe
no human is at home, yet the task must be completed. In this
case, a TAI agent can still get things done, in creative fash-
ion. E.g., suppose that in the home a family member received
beforehand a small blimp that can fly around inside the home
and pick things up.4 The TAI agent might then activate and
use this blimp through I/IoT to put the cup atop the saucer.
But what, more precisely, is a TAI agent? We say that a TAI
agent must be:
D1 Capable of problem-solving. Whereas, as we’ve noted, stan-
dard AI counts simple mappings from percepts to actions
as bona fide AI, TAI agents must be capable of problem-
solving. This may seem like an insignificant first attribute of
TAI, but a consequence that stems from this attribute should
be noted: Since problem-solving entails capability across
the main sub-divisions of AI, TAI agents have multi-faceted
power. Problem-solving requires capability in these sub-areas
of AI: planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, creativ-
ity (at least relatively simple forms thereof), and — for mak-
ing physical changes in physical environments — cognitive
robotics.5 Hence, all TAI agents can plan, reason, learn, com-
municate; and they are creative and capable of carrying out
physical actions.
D2 Capable of solving at least important instances of problems
that are at and/or above Turing-unsolvable problems. AI of
today, when capable of solving problems, invariably achieves
this success on problems that are merely algorithmically solv-
able and tractable (e.g., checkers, chess, Go).
D3 Able to supply justification, explanation, and certification of
supplied solutions, how they were arrived at, and that these so-
lutions are safe/ethical. We thus say that the problem-solving
4Such a blimp is a simple adaptation of what is readily available
as a relatively inexpensive toy.
5Cognitive robotics is defined in [Levesque and Lakemeyer,
2007] as a type of robotics in which all substantive actions per-
formed by the robots are a function of the cognitive states (e.g. be-
liefs & intentions) of these robots.
of a TAI agent is rationalist. This label reflects the require-
ment that any proposed solution to the problem discovered by a
TAI agent must be accompanied by a justification that defends
and explains that the proposed solution is a solution, and, when
appropriate, also that the solution (and indeed perhaps the pro-
cess used to obtain the solution) has certain desirable proper-
ties. Minimally, the justification must include an argument or
proof for the relevant conclusions. In addition, the justifica-
tion must be verified, formally; we thus say that certification
is provided by a TAI agent.
D4 Capable of “theory-of-mind” level reasoning, planning, and
communication. Discussion of this attribute is omitted to save
space; see e.g. [Arkoudas and Bringsjord, 2009] for our lab’s
first foray into automated reasoning at this level. (The truth is,
it’s more accurate to say the fourth requirement is that a TAI
agent must have cognitive consciousness, as this phenomenon
is explained and axiomatized in [Bringsjord et al., 2018].)
D5 Capable of creativity, minimally to the level of so-called m-
creativity. Creativity in artificial agents, and the engineer-
ing thereof, has been discussed in a number of places by
Bringsjord [Bringsjord and Ferrucci, 2000]e.g., but recently
Bringsjord and Sen [2016] have called for a form of creativity
in artificial agents using I/IoT.
D6 Has “tentacular” power wielded throughout I/IoT, Edge Com-
puting, and cyberspace. This is the most important attribute
possessed by TAI agents, and is reflected in the ‘T’ in ‘TAI.’
To say that such agents have tentacular problem-solving power
is to say that they can perceive and act through the I/IoT (or
equivalent networks) and cyberspace, across the globe. TAI
agents thus operate in a planet-sized, heterogeneous environ-
ment that spans the narrower, fixed environments used to de-
fine conventional, present-day AI, such as is found in [Russell
and Norvig, 2009].
2 Related Work
Given the limited scope of the present paper, we only make
some brief comments about related work, which can be par-
titioned for convenience into that which is can be plausibly
regarded as on the road toward the level of expressivity and
associated automated reasoning that TAI requires, and prior
work that provides a stark and illuminating contrast with TAI.
First, as to work we see as reaching toward TAI, we note
that recently Miller et al. [2018] present a planning frame-
work that they call social planning, in which the agent under
consideration can plan and act in a manner that takes account
of the beliefs of other agents. The goal for an agent in social
planning can either be a particular state of the external world,
or a set of beliefs of other agents (or a mix of both). The
system is built upon a simplified version of a propositional
modal logic (unlike our system, presented below, which is
more expressive and can accommodate more complex goals,
e.g. goals over unbounded domains or goals that involve nu-
merical quantification; such statements require going beyond
propositional modal logic). In addition, certainly the NARS
system from Wang [2006] has elements that one can ratio-
nally view as congenial to TAI. For instance, NARS is multi-
layered and reasoning-centric. On the other hand, the ‘N’
in ‘NARS’ is for ‘Non-axiomatic,’ and TAI, and indeed the
entire approach to logicist AI pursued by at least Bringsjord
and Govindarajulu, seeks whenever possible to leverage auto-
mated reasoning over powerful axiom systems, such as Peano
Arithmetic.6 In addition, TAI is deeply and irreducibly inten-
sional, while NARS appears to be purely extensional. Clever
management of computational resources in TAI is clearly go-
ing to be key, and we see the work of Thorisson and col-
leagues (e.g. [Helgason et al., 2012]) to be quite relevant
to TAI and the challenges the implementation of it will en-
counter. For a final example of work that is generally aligned
with TAI, we bring to the reader’s attention a recent compre-
hensive treatment of proof-based work in computer science:
[Arkoudas and Musser, 2017]. As TAI is steadfastly proof-
based AI, this tome provides very nice coverage of the kind
of work required to implement TAI.
Secondly, for illuminating contrast, we note first that some
have considered the concept of corporate intelligence com-
posed of multiple agents, including machines, where inspi-
ration comes from biology. A case in point is the fascinat-
ing modeling in [Seidita et al., 2016].7 In our case, TAI is a
thoroughly formal conception independent of terrestrial biol-
ogy, one that is intended to include types of agents of greater
intelligence than those currently on Earth. Another illumi-
nating contrast comes via considering established languages
for planning that are purely extensional in nature (e.g. PDDL,
which in its early form is given in [Mcdermott et al., 1998]),
as therefore quite different than planning of the type that is
required for TAI, which must be intensional in character, and
is (since cognitive calculi are intensional computational log-
ics). MA-PDDL is an extension of PDDL for handling do-
mains with multiple agents with varying actions and goals
[Kovacs, 2012], and as such would seem to be relevant to TAI.
But unlike social planning discussed above, MA-PDDL does
not aim to change beliefs (nor for that matter other epistemic
attitudes) of other agents. While MA-PDDL could be used
to do so, representing beliefs and other cognitive states in
PDDL’s extensional language can lead to undesirable conse-
quences, as demonstrated in [Bringsjord and Govindarajulu,
2012]. Extensions of the original PDDL (PDDL1), for exam-
ple PDDL3 [Gerevini and Long, 2004], are still extensional
in nature.
This concludes the related-work section. Note that below
we describe and define TAI from the point of view of AI plan-
ning.
3 Quick Overview
We give a quick and informal overview of TAI. We have a set
of agents a1, . . . , an. Each agent has an associated (implicit
or explicit) contract that it should adhere to. Consider one
particular agent τ . During the course of this agent’s lifetime,
6The layering of TAI is in fact anticipated by the increasingly
powerful axiom-centric cognition described in [Bringsjord, 2015],
which takes Peano Arithmetic as central.
7Though out of reach for now, given that our chief objective
is but an informative introduction to TAI, the relationship between
our conception of cognitive consciousness, which is central to TAI
agents (Attribute #4 above), and consciousness as conceived by
Chella, is a fertile topic for future investigation. A multi-faceted dis-
cussion of artificial consciousness is by the way to be had in [Chella
and Manzotti, 2007]. For a first-draft axiomatization of the brand of
consciousness central to TAI agents, see [Bringsjord et al., 2018].
…
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Figure 1: TAI Informal Overview: We have an architecture for how
a TAI agent τ might operate. τ continuously comes up with goals
based on its contract. If a goal is not achievable using τ ’s own
resources, τ has to employ other agents in achieving this goal. To
successfully do so τ would need to have one or more of D1 −D6
attributes.
the agent comes up with goals to achieve so that its contract
is not violated. Some of these goals might require an agent
to exercise some or all of the six attributes D1 − D6. We
formalize this using planning as shown in Figure 1. As shown
in the figure, if some goal is not achievable on its own, τ
can seek to recruit other agents by leveraging their resources,
beliefs, obligations etc.
4 The Formal System
……
…
Figure 2: Space of Logical Calculi. There are five dimensions that
cover the entire, vast space of logical calculi. The due West dimen-
sion holds those calculi powering the Semantic Web (which are gen-
erally short of first-order logic =L1), and include so-called descrip-
tion logics. Both NW and NE include logical systems with wffs that
are allowed to be infinitely long, and are needless to say hard to
compute with and over. SE is higher-order logic, which has a robust
automated theorem-proving community gathered around it. It’s the
SW direction that holds the cognitive calculi described in the present
paper, and associated with TAI; and the star refers to those specific
cognitive calculi called out in these pages by us.
To make the above notions more concrete, we use a version
of a computational logic. The logic we use is deontic cogni-
tive event calculus (DCEC). This calculus is a first-order
modal logic. Figure 2 shows the region where DCEC is lo-
cated in the overall space of logical calculi. DCEC belongs
to the cognitive calculi family of logical calculi (denoted by
a star in Figure 2 and expanded in Figure 3). DCEC has a
well-defined syntax and inference system; see Appendix A of
[Govindarajulu and Bringsjord, 2017a] for a full description.
The inference system is based on natural deduction [Gentzen,
1935], and includes all the introduction and elimination rules
for first-order logic, as well as inference schemata for the
modal operators and related structures
This system has been used previously in [Govindarajulu
and Bringsjord, 2017a; Govindarajulu et al., 2017] to auto-
mate versions of the doctrine of double effect DDE , an eth-
ical principle with deontological and consequentialist com-
ponents. While describing the calculus is beyond the scope
of this paper, we give a quick overview of the system below.
Dialects of DCEC have also been used to formalize and auto-
mate highly intensional (i.e. cognitive) reasoning processes,
such as the false-belief task [Arkoudas and Bringsjord, 2008]
and akrasia (succumbing to temptation to violate moral prin-
ciples) [Bringsjord et al., 2014]. Arkoudas and Bringsjord
[2008] introduced the general family of cognitive event cal-
culi to which DCEC belongs, by way of their formalization
of the false-belief task. More precisely, DCEC is a sorted
(i.e. typed) quantified modal logic (also known as sorted first-
order modal logic) that includes the event calculus, a first-
order calculus used for commonsense reasoning.
CC
CEC
DCEC
µC
DCEC⇤
DCEC⇤e
Figure 3: Cognitive Calculi. The cognitive calculi family is com-
posed of a number of related calculi. Arkoudas and Bringsjord in-
troduced the first member in this family, CEC, to model the false-
belief task. The smallest member in this family, µC, has been
used to model uncertainty in quantified beliefs [Govindarajulu and
Bringsjord, 2017b]. DCEC and variants have been used in the mod-
elling of ethical principles and theories and their implementations.
4.1 Syntax
As mentioned above, DCEC is a sorted calculus. A sorted
system can be regarded as analogous to a typed single-
inheritance programming language. We show below some of
the important sorts used in DCEC.
Sort Description
Agent Human and non-human actors.
Time The Time type stands for time in the domain.
E.g. simple, such as ti, or complex, such as
birthday(son(jack)).
Event Used for events in the domain.
ActionType Action types are abstract actions. They are in-
stantiated at particular times by actors. Exam-
ple: eating.
Action A subtype of Event for events that occur as
actions by agents.
Fluent Used for representing states of the world in the
event calculus.
The syntax has two components: a first-order core and a
modal system that builds upon this first-order core. The fig-
ures below show the syntax and inference schemata ofDCEC.
The first-order core of DCEC is the event calculus [Mueller,
2006]. Commonly used function and relation symbols of the
event calculus are included. Fluents, event and times are the
three major sorts of the event calculus. Fluents represent
states of the world as first-order terms. Events are things that
happen in the world at specific instants of time. Actions are
events that are carried out by an agent. For any action type
α and agent a, the event corresponding to a carrying out α is
given by action(a, α). For instance if α is “running” and a is
“Jack” , action(a, α) denotes “Jack is running”. Other cal-
culi (e.g. the situation calculus) for modeling commonsense
and physical reasoning can be easily switched out in-place of
the event calculus.
Syntax
S ::= Agent | ActionType | Action v Event | Moment | Fluent
f ::=

action : Agent× ActionType→ Action
initially : Fluent→ Formula
holds : Fluent× Moment→ Formula
happens : Event× Moment→ Formula
clipped : Moment× Fluent× Moment→ Formula
initiates : Event× Fluent× Moment→ Formula
terminates : Event× Fluent× Moment→ Formula
prior : Moment× Moment→ Formula
t ::= x : S | c : S | f(t1, . . . , tn)
φ ::=

q : Formula | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | ∀x : φ(x) |
P(a, t, φ) |K(a, t, φ) |
C(t, φ) | S(a, b, t, φ) | S(a, t, φ) |B(a, t, φ)
D(a, t, φ) | I(a, t, φ)
O(a, t, φ, (¬)happens(action(a∗, α), t′))
The modal operators present in the calculus include the
standard operators for knowledge K, belief B, desire D, in-
tention I, etc. The general format of an intensional operator is
K (a, t, φ), which says that agent a knows at time t the propo-
sition φ. Here φ can in turn be any arbitrary formula. Also,
note the following modal operators: P for perceiving a state,
C for common knowledge, S for agent-to-agent communica-
tion and public announcements, B for belief, D for desire, I
for intention, and finally and crucially, a dyadic deontic op-
eratorO that states when an action is obligatory or forbidden
for agents. It should be noted that DCEC is one specimen in
a family of extensible cognitive calculi.
The calculus also includes a dyadic (arity = 2) deontic op-
erator O. It is well known that the unary ought in standard
deontic logic leads to contradictions. Our dyadic version of
the operator blocks the standard list of such contradictions,
and beyond.8
Declarative communication of φ between a and b at time t
is represented using the S(a, b, t, φ).
4.2 Inference Schemata
The figure below shows a fragment of the inference schemata
for DCEC. First-order natural deduction introduction and
elimination rules are not shown. Inference schemata IK and
IB let us model idealized systems that have their knowledge
and beliefs closed under the DCEC proof theory. While hu-
mans are not deductively closed, these two rules lets us model
more closely how more deliberate agents such as organiza-
tions, nations and more strategic actors reason. (Some di-
alects of cognitive calculi restrict the number of iterations on
intensional operators.) I13 ties intentions directly to percep-
tions (This model does not take into account agents that could
fail to carry out their intentions). I14 dictates how obligations
get translated into known intentions.
Inference Schemata (Fragment)
K(a, t1,Γ), Γ ` φ, t1 ≤ t2
K(a, t2, φ)
[IK]
B(a, t1,Γ), Γ ` φ, t1 ≤ t2
B(a, t2, φ)
[IB]
K(a, t, φ)
φ
[I4]
t < t′, I(a, t, ψ)
P(a, t′, ψ)
[I13]
B(a, t, φ) B(a, t,O(a, t, φ, χ)) O(a, t, φ, χ)
K(a, t, I(a, t, χ))
[I14]
4.3 Semantics
The semantics for the first-order fragment is the standard first-
order semantics. The truth-functional connectives ∧,∨,→,¬
and quantifiers ∀,∃ for pure first-order formulae all have
the standard first-order semantics. The semantics of the
modal operators differs from what is available in the so-called
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) logics [Rao and Georgeff,
1991] in many important ways. For example, DCEC explic-
itly rejects possible-worlds semantics and model-based rea-
soning, instead opting for a proof-theoretic semantics and the
associated type of reasoning commonly referred to as natu-
ral deduction [Gentzen, 1935; Francez and Dyckhoff, 2010].
Briefly, in this approach, meanings of modal operators are
defined via arbitrary computations over proofs.
Goals
Actions
Prohbitions
Obligations
…
Ag
en
t
g
t1
t2
Goal
Proof/argument for 
non existence of plan 
using just 
t3
Goal
t4
Plan using 
other agents
Figure 4: TAI Working Through Time. A TAI agent initially consid-
ers a goal and then has to produce a proof for the non-existence of a
non-tentacular plan that uses only this agent. Then τ recruits a set
of other relevant agents to help with its goal.
5 Defining TAI
We denote the state-of-affairs at any time t by a set of for-
mulae Γ(t). This set of formulae will also contain any obli-
gations and prohibitions on different agents. For each agent
ai at time t, there is a contract c(ai, t) ⊆ Γ(t) that describes
ai’s obligations, prohibitions etc. a at any time t then comes
up with a goal g so that its contract is satisfied.9 The agent
believes that if g does not hold then its contract at some future
t+ δ will be violated:
B
(
a, t,¬g → ¬
∧
c(a, t+ δ)
)
Then the agent tries to come up with a plan involving a se-
quence of actions to satisfy the goal.
We make these notions more precise. An agent a has a
set of actions that it can perform at different time points.
For instance, a vacuuming agent can have movement along
a plane as its possible actions while an agent on a phone can
have displaying a notification as an action. We denote this by
can(a, α, t) with the following additional axiom:
Axiom ¬can(a, α, t)→ ¬happens(action(a, α), t)
We now define a consistent plan below:
Consistent Plan
A consistent plan ρ〈a1,...,an〉 at time t is a sequence of agents
a1, . . . , an with corresponding actions α1, . . . , αn and times
t1, . . . , tn such that Γ ` (t < ti < tj) for i < j and for all
8A overview of this list is given lucidly in [McNamara, 2010].
9See [Govindarajulu and Bringsjord, 2017a] for an example of
how obligations and prohibitions can be used in DCEC.
agents ai we have:
1. can(ai, αi, ti)
2. happens(action(ai, αi)) is consistent with Γ(t).
Note that a consistent plan ρ〈...〉 can be represented by a term
in our language. We introduce a new sort Plan and a variable-
arity predicate symbol plan(ρ, a1, . . . , an) which says that ρ
is a plan involving a1 . . . , an.
A goal is also any formula g. A consistent plan satisfies a
goal g if:
(
Γ(t) ∪
{
happens(action(a1, α1), t1), . . . ,
happens(action(an, αn), tn)
})
` g
We use Γ ` (ρ → g) as a shorthand for the above. The
above definitions of plans and goals give us the following im-
portant constraint needed for defining TAI. This differenti-
ates our planning formalism from other planning systems and
makes it more appropriate for an architecture for a general-
purpose tentacular AI system.
Uniform Planning Constraint
Plans and goals should be represented and reasoned over in the
language of the planning system.
Leveraging the above requirement, we can define two lev-
els of TAI agents. A Level(1) TAI system corresponding to
an agent τ is a system that comes up with goal g at time t′ to
satisfy its contract, produces a proof that there is no consis-
tent plan that involves only the agent τ . Then τ comes with a
plan that involves one or more other agents. A Level(1) TAI
agent starts with knowledge about what actions are possible
for other agents.
Level(1) TAI Agents
Prerequisite For any a, α, t, we have:
Γ `can(a, α, t)→ K(τ, t′, can(a, α, t))
Then
1. τ produces a proof that no plan exists for g involving just
itself and τ declares that there is no such plan.
Γ `S(τ, t′,¬∃ρ : (plan(ρ, τ) ∧ ρ→ g) )
2. τ produces a plan for g involving just itself and one or
more agents and declares that plan.
Γ `S
(
τ, t′,
(
plan(ρ, a1, . . . , τ . . . an) ∧ ρ→ g
))
The agent may not always have knowledge about what
other agents can do. The TAI agent may have imperfect
knowledge about other agents. The agent can gain informa-
tion about other agents’ actions, their obligations, prohibi-
tions, etc. by observing them or by reading specifications
governing these agents. In this case, we get a Level(2) TAI
agent. We need to modify only the prerequisite condition
above.
Level(2) TAI Agents
Prerequisite For any a, α, t, we have:
Γ `can(a, α, t)→ B(τ, t′, can(a, α, t))
The TAI agents above can be considered first-order ten-
tacular agents. We can also have a higher-order TAI agent
that intentionally engages in actions that trigger one or more
other agents to act in tentacular fashion as described above.
The need for having the uniform planning constraint is more
clear when we consider higher-order agents.
6 A Hierarchy of TAI Agents
The TAI formalization above gives rise to multiple hierar-
chies of tentacular agents. We discuss some of the these be-
low.
Syntactic Goal Complexity The goal g can range in complexity
from simple propositional statements, e.g. cleanKitchen,
to first-order statements. e.g. ∀r : Room : clean(r), and
to intensional statements representing cognitive states of other
agents
B(a, now,B(b, now, ∀r : clean(r)))
Goal Variation According to the definition above, an agent a qual-
ifies as being tentacular if it plans for just one goal g in tentac-
ular fashion as laid out in the conditions above. We could have
agents that plan for a number of varied and different goals in
tentacular fashion.
Plan Complexity For many goals, there will usually be multiple
plans involving different actions (with different costs and re-
sources used) and executed by different agents.
s e
s
e
NY State 

Road System
House 18 Agent
Environment
s Sensor
e Effector
Key
Figure 5: Pictorial Overview. A bit of explanation: That some agents
are within agents indicates that the outer agent knows and/or be-
lieves everything relevant about the inner agent; hence as agents
are increasingly cognitively powerful, the depth of their epistemic
attitudes grows (reflected in formulae with iterated belief/knowledge
operators). Agents grow in size/intelligence in lockstep with the log-
ical calculi upon which they are based increasing in expressivity and
reasoning power; L0 is zero-order logic, L1 is e.g. first-order logic,
and the particular cognitive calculus DCEC is shown. Rotation in-
dicates simply that, through time, agents perceive and act.
7 Examples and Embryonic Implementation
In this section, we present a formal sketch of a TAI agent and
then describe using another example ongoing work in imple-
menting a TAI system.
7.1 Example
Consider the example given in the beginning. We have a hu-
man j and three artificial agents: ac in the car, ah in the home
and ap an agent managing scheduling and calendar informa-
tion. We present some of the formulae in Γ.
B(ac, t0, crowded(store)→ unusal), f1
P(ac, t1, crowded(store)), f2
∀t : O
(
ac, t,unusal,
happens
(
action(ac, check(weather)), t+ 1
)) f3
∀t : B
(
ac, t, f3
)
∀a :
happens(action(a, check(weather)), t3)
→ K(a, t4, storm),
 f4
∀t : O(ac, t, storm, S(ac, ah, storm, t+ 1))), f5
∀t : B
(
ac, t, f5
)
The above formulae first state the fact that ac observes the
store being crowded. ac’s contract states that the agent should
check a weather service if it finds something unusual. The
formulae also states that if an agent checks the weather at t3,
the agent will get a prediction about an incoming storm. ac’s
contract places an obligation on it to inform ah if it believes
that a storm is incoming.
∀t : O(ah, t, storm, ∀s : quantity(s) > 0), f6
K
(
ah, t5,shops(j, today) ∨ shops(j, tomorrow)
→ ∀s : quantity(s) > 0
)
, f7
∀t : B
(
ah, t,happens
(
action(ac, recc(shops(j))), t
)
→ shops(j)
)
f8
∀t : B
 ah, t, happens(action(ah, req(ac, shops(j))), t)
→ happens(action(ac, recc(shops(j))), t)
 f9
The first formula above states that ah ought to see to it that
supplies are stocked in the event of a storm. Then we have
that ah knows that the human j shopping today or tomorrow
can result in the supplies being stocked. ah gets information
from ap that shopping tomorrow is not possible (this formula
is not shown). Then we have formulae stating the effects of
ac recommending the shopping action to j. The goal for ah
is ∀s : quantity(s) > 0 and a plan for it is built up using ah,
ac and j.
7.2 Toward an Implementation
We describe an example scenario that we are targeting for an
embryonic implementation.
Beforehand, a number of contracts have been executed that
bind the adult parents P1 and P2 in a home H , and also bind
a number of artificial agents in H , including a TAI agent
(τ ) that oversees the home. (Strictly speaking, the agents
wouldn’t have entered into contracts, but they would know
that their human owners have done so, and they would know
what the contracts are.)
It’s winter in Berlin NY. Night. Outside, a blizzard.
The mother and father of the homeH , and their two
toddler children, are fast asleep. The smartphone
of each parent is set to “Do Not Disturb”, with in-
coming clearance for only close family. There is no
landline phone. A carbon monoxide sensor in the
basement, near the furnace, suddenly shows a read-
out indicating an elevated level, which proceeds to
creep up. τ perceives this, and forms hypotheses
about what is causing the elevated reading, and be-
lieves on the basis of using a cognitive calculus that
the reading is accurate (to some likelihood factor).
The nearest firehouse is notified by τ . No alarm
sounds in the house. τ runs a diagnostic and deter-
mines that the battery for the central auditory alarm
is shot. The reading creeps up higher, and now even
the sensors in the upstairs bedrooms where the hu-
mans are asleep show an elevated, and climbing,
level. τ perceives this too.
Unfortunately, τ reasons that by the time the firemen ar-
rive, permanent neurological damage or even death may well
(need again a likelihood factor) be caused in the case of one or
more members of the family. Should the alarm company have
programmed the sensor to report to a central command, still,
any human command is fallible. The company may be negli-
gent, or a phone call may be the only option at their disposal,
or they may dispatch personnel who arrive too late. Without
enlisting the help of other artificial agents in planning and
reasoning, τ can’t save the family; τ knows this on the basis
of proof/argument.
However, τ can likely wake the family up, starting with the
parents, in any number of ways. However, each of these ways
entails violation of at least one legal prohibition that has been
created by contracts that are in place. These contracts have
been analyzed by an IBM service, which has stocked the mind
of τ with knowledge of legal obligations inDCEC— or rather
in a dialect that has separate obligation operators for legal
Ol and moral Om obligations. The moral obligation to save
the family overrides the legal prohibitions, however. τ turns
on the TV in the master bedroom at maximum volume, and
flashes a warning to leave the house immediately because of
the lethal gas building up. (There are many other alternatives,
of course. TAI could break through Do Not Disturb, eg).
7.3 Toward Using Smart-City Infrastructure
The European Initiative on Smart Cities [eur, 2018] is an ef-
fort by the European Commission [ec, 2018] to improve the
quality of life throughout Europe, while progressing toward
energy and climate objectives. Many of its goals are rele-
vant to and desirable in the world at large. TAI has the po-
tential to be instrumental in achieving many of these, such
as smart appliances (in the manner discussed in the previous
sub-section) and intelligent traffic management. Indeed, the
scope and objectives of the Initiative may conceivably be con-
siderably broadened with a pervasive application of TAI.
We briefly point at a simple scenario that expands on the
vision of the European Initiative’s smart-transportation goals.
Parking space is very scarce on a work-day in mid-
town Manhattan. A busy executive will need to
park near several offices over the course of the day,
and these locations change over the week.
The executive’s car consults her calendar. Based on past
patterns, it interpolates locations where it believes she intends
to park. It communicates with other cars parked at these lo-
cations, and determines when their owners are likely to re-
turn, based on their expressed (and inferable) intentions and
current locations. Adjusting for the location of our executive,
traffic conditions and changes in her agenda, it determines the
optimal parking locations dynamically, throughout her busy
day. Of course, in the spirit of TAI, all other cars would have
their movement adjusted accordingly, through time.10
8 Conclusion & Future Work
We have introduced Tentacular AI, and a number of archi-
tectural elements thereof, and are under no illusion that we
have accomplished more than this. At AEGAP 2018, we
will demonstrate TAI in action in both the scenarios sketched
above; implementation is currently underway. Despite the
nascent state of the TAI research program, we hope to have
provided a promising, if inchoate, overview of tentacular AI
— an overview which, given the centrality of highly expres-
sive languages for novel planning and reasoning, we hope is
of interest to some, maybe even many, at this dawn of the
“internet of things” and its vibrant intersection with AI.
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